Since mid-August 2026, a phishing operation has been stealing live Google sessions from corporate users. Tracked by Material Security as "Operation CloudFire," the campaign has taken down 897 domains so far and continues to evolve. What makes it notable is that it can defeat multi-factor authentication: the operator runs a live proxy in front of the real Google sign-in page, relaying the victim's password, SMS codes, authenticator codes, Google's Tap-Yes number-match, and phone-based account recovery to Google as they arrive.
Can MFA Be Bypassed?
Yes — and this campaign is a working example of how. The attacker does not need to break MFA; instead they relay the victim's legitimate, real-time approval through a man-in-the-middle proxy. The victim enters a genuine password, receives a genuine prompt, and approves it — all inside a session the operator is watching. Because the server forwards each factor to Google as it arrives, SMS codes, authenticator codes, number-match prompts, and phone-based recovery all succeed, yet the resulting session is handed to the attacker. This is one of the clearest demonstrations that MFA can be bypassed when the challenge is relayed in real time.
How the Attack Arrives
The lure comes as a Google Calendar invite, sometimes delivered by BCC, often from an organization the recipient has corresponded with before. Themes are deliberately dull: voicemail notifications, RFP and RFI requests, court summonses, missed payment notices.
The links inside are almost all legitimately Google, Google's own /url redirector, with the real destination tucked into a query parameter. Other waves used share.google and Drive file links for the same purpose. One variant used Intuit transaction notification links. At the moment a message gets scored, the domain, certificate, and reputation on display are legitimate and trusted.
The framework behind all this has been documented publicly since February under the name Nyasher, after a key left hardcoded in its JavaScript.
Why Nothing Flags It
Reputation controls answer a question about ownership. This campaign was assembled so those questions consistently returned reassuring answers.
- The first layer is Google itself.
- The second is a Cloudflare Turnstile challenge (in some builds the genuine widget served from Cloudflare).
- The third layer, the page that captures the password, has no address to scan at all. It is built in memory by script after a visitor clears the challenge, leaving nothing for a crawler to fetch and nothing to turn up in a proxy log. To Material's knowledge those pages have never been scanned by anyone.
The infrastructure is bought to be thrown away: nine lure domains across five registrars, most registered days before use, with receiving endpoints staged one to twenty days ahead. One wildcard certificate was issued 46 minutes before the domain it covers was even registered. Blocking any single piece costs the operator a few dollars and an afternoon.
What Tracking It Has Looked Like
Material has monitored the campaign since it began and follows each new variant as lures, gates, and receiving endpoints rotate. Since August 2026, Material catches over 99% of malicious messages in a campaign once detections are developed, with a reclassification rate of 0.01%. No single signal carries the decision: Material scores technical indicators, the intent of the message, where links resolve, and the sending relationship behind them. A hit on any one is enough to act on.
Calendar invites are a poor fit for a gateway built to inspect mail in transit, and much of this campaign arrives as an invite. Material treats calendar invites as a threat surface of their own, with the account's full history available as context.
Three Questions for Your Team
- When a phishing link arrives wrapped in a Google URL, what in the stack examines where it leads?
- When the outcome is a hijacked session rather than a stolen password, the evidence lands in Workspace logs instead of the mail filter. Who is reading those, and how quickly?
- A live Google session reaches mail, Drive, and the ability to grant OAuth access in the victim's name. How much of that blast radius can your team close inside an hour?
The Next Campaign Is Already Written
Shipped alongside the live Google code is an unfinished Microsoft 365 branch: a stylesheet path, a second harness, and a title string that decodes to a Microsoft sign-in prompt. None of those paths resolve today. Adding the brand takes a file drop and no code changes. The operator has already built the follow-on and has not switched it on yet. Material expects that pivot and is watching for it.
Sources
- Material Security, "Reputation Says It's Fine: How Calendar Invites and a Live MFA Proxy Steal Google Sessions" (Oct 1, 2026)
- BleepingComputer, "Google Calendar phishing campaign hijacks sessions, bypasses MFA"
- Material Security follow-up, "897 domains later: how Operation CloudFire burned the calendar invite campaign"
- OSINTSights, "Google Calendar phishing campaign exposes session-hijacking tactics"
mfa be bypassed