Malicious GitHub projects target security developers
A project that looks like a useful security tool can be a delivery mechanism for malware. Doctor Web researchers reported finding infected GitHub repositories aimed at information-security professionals and blockchain game enthusiasts. Their analysis describes malicious code placed in Microsoft Visual Studio project files and in Python and Go source files. The final payload, named Microsoft.exe, deploys a backdoor, a cryptocurrency clipboard hijacker and a data-stealing trojan.
Doctor Web said more than 2,000 PCs were infected at the time of its research. That figure is the researchers’ reported count, not a measure of the campaign’s current reach. The discovery is a reminder that technical subject matter and a familiar development workflow do not make a repository trustworthy.
The findings are based on Doctor Web’s investigation, published November 5, 2026, and reported by BleepingComputer the following day. The report focuses on infected projects and their malware chain; it does not establish that every repository or project bearing a security-related name is malicious.
How the repositories deliver malware
The malicious code was found in Visual Studio solution user-option files (.suo) and project files (.csproj), as well as in Python and Go source code. Those placements let the infection ride alongside projects that appear to be development or security tools. A person downloading or working with such a project may encounter the malicious execution path as part of what seems to be ordinary project activity.
Doctor Web says infected repositories first appeared about two years before its report. The researchers observed several execution modes, rather than a single fixed loader sequence. Their analysis characterizes the methods as varied in how they load components and bypass protections. Some use additional modules and configuration files, while a mode described as “Handler” relies on hardcoded data and fewer modules. Doctor Web considered Handler possibly a legacy method, but presented that as an interpretation rather than a confirmed explanation.
The campaign’s purpose is not limited to compromising general users. Doctor Web specifically identified information-security professionals as targets, alongside blockchain game enthusiasts. This is notable because such developers may routinely inspect unfamiliar code, test tools and move between projects. The available reporting, however, does not identify individual victims or explain how the operators selected particular professionals.
Execution and security evasion
Microsoft.exe is described as the last-stage payload. The delivery chain uses different modes to deploy malicious modules, with protection-bypass techniques varying between them. Doctor Web’s account indicates that these modes ultimately launch two AsyncRAT files and Trojan.InjectNET.14. The researchers described multiple layers of obfuscation and evasion in the malware’s operation, but the central outcome is clear: remote access and theft capabilities are installed on the compromised device.
AsyncRAT gives the operators remote access to an infected computer. Doctor Web found two identical malicious files that inject their content into processes; the network ports differ. The researchers said this could allow two malware operators to control one device at the same time, describing that as a possible explanation rather than a demonstrated operational fact.
The loader also deploys Trojan.InjectNET.14, which injects the code of Trojan.Clipper.688 into regasm.exe. The clipper watches clipboard activity and substitutes cryptocurrency wallet addresses, redirecting transfers to addresses controlled by an attacker. Doctor Web says the malware also takes screenshots and sends them to an attackers’ Telegram bot, together with the clipper version, active-window title, user login and device IP address.
Payloads collect credentials and disrupt defenses
After deploying the other components, the trojan unpacks JS.Stealer.191 from an archive named Nexara/Nvdia.7z. Doctor Web identifies the stealer as an Electron-based application. It attempts to detect whether it is running in a sandbox or virtual machine, then collects information from the infected computer and steals several categories of user data.
The listed targets include browser data, FileZilla XML files, MobaXterm settings, Total Commander FTP configuration, VPN settings, messenger files, video-game and game-platform account information, and Discord tokens. The stolen material is compressed and sent to the operators through Telegram. This mix of targets reaches beyond browser passwords: saved remote-access and VPN configuration can expose access details used in day-to-day technical work.
Doctor Web also reported that the malware attempts to remove ESET, McAfee or Malwarebytes products if they are installed. It modifies the Windows hosts file to block access to certain domains associated with antivirus vendors. The malware also deletes files and folders under the system32 drivers etc directory, except for a stated whitelist of files. These actions can interfere with security software and with users’ ability to create or use backups. They are reported behaviors of this malware, not evidence that every infected system suffered the same outcome.
Reported reach and possible next steps
Doctor Web counted more than 2,000 infected PCs during its research. That reported impact gives the campaign a measurable scale, although the source does not provide a breakdown by country, organization or victim type. It also does not say how many of those machines belonged to security professionals specifically.
Researchers found unused routines associated with downloading and unpacking another archive, Lodge.7z. That archive contained an unfinished Electron project with an executable named WUDFHost.exe. Doctor Web said its code offered clues to features the malware’s authors might add, including creating a service for Microsoft.exe persistence, checking for and redownloading the executable, controlling application startup and updating the malware. These were prospective capabilities inferred from unused code, not confirmed features already active across infected machines.
The campaign’s combination of repository-based delivery, remote access, clipboard manipulation and broad data theft makes it especially concerning for people who handle technical projects and account credentials. The evidence in the reports supports a specific warning: malicious code was embedded in projects presented through GitHub, and the resulting malware had substantial access and theft capabilities. It does not support treating GitHub projects as a category as inherently unsafe, or assuming that every security tool repository is part of this campaign.
Sources: BleepingComputer report and Doctor Web research.
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