What happened in the ScreenConnect MSP campaign
ConnectWise said it was investigating an active campaign involving unauthorized access to partner accounts and unauthorized remote-access software in customer environments. Huntress reported that attackers abused ScreenConnect environments to deploy rogue remote-access clients on customer devices, including through ScreenConnect’s Run Command capability. ScreenConnect is a legitimate remote support platform used by MSPs and IT teams. sourceRef
Huntress said it had identified six compromised MSPs and more than 286 affected endpoints across 47 organizations when the activity was reported; it said those counts were still rising. ConnectWise separately reported that it had disabled five extensions across approximately 400 partner environments as a precaution. These are figures reported at different stages and for different measures—not a final victim count. sourceRef
The available reporting does not establish AI involvement in this incident. It describes a different risk: compromise of a trusted service provider can expose multiple downstream organizations through legitimate administration tools. sourceRef
What investigators know—and what remains unconfirmed
Huntress reported observing rogue ScreenConnect clients and retrieving attacker scripts that remained accessible for analysis. It described use of ScreenConnect Run Command and custom-built tooling, in some cases compiled on a victim’s computer. Huntress said its telemetry pointed to compromised credentials or hijacked operator sessions as possible access methods; the initial entry path had not been established publicly. sourceRef
ConnectWise identified five independent third-party extensions that might be associated with the attacks and disabled them across approximately 400 partner environments as a precaution. Its advisory named Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, and RMM+ Password Link. ConnectWise cautioned that the presence of an extension alone does not prove compromise and that disabling extensions does not remove software, persistence, or unauthorized access already established on devices. sourceRef
Reports that technician workstations had been compromised after technicians initiated interactive sessions with infected customer devices were still being confirmed. The mechanism and extent of any such spread were not publicly established. Treat this as an unconfirmed reported risk to investigate, not as proven behavior. Huntress also cited sequential attacker-assigned identifiers as a reason to consider whether additional MSPs might have been compromised earlier; that observation is not proof that every ScreenConnect user was affected. sourceRef
Why this is a supply-chain compromise concern
The reported activity involved unauthorized remote-access clients in customer environments and unauthorized access to partner accounts. This raises a supply-chain concern because access through a service provider can affect organizations beyond the provider itself. The reporting does not establish a single mechanism or scope of downstream impact for every affected environment. sourceRef
MSPs and customers can review which provider accounts and tools are permitted to execute commands, install agents, or open interactive sessions, and ensure those actions can be independently audited. These are defensive recommendations, not reported findings about every environment in this incident.
The reporting described abuse of legitimate functionality and possible credential or session compromise; it did not identify a specific ScreenConnect vulnerability as the initial access vector. The entry path remained unconfirmed. Patching remains important, but it does not replace review of identities, sessions, extensions, and command activity. sourceRef
Response steps for MSPs and customers
- Review the named extensions. ConnectWise said it disabled the five extensions in affected cloud-hosted environments and advised on-premises customers to disable them manually. It cautioned that an extension’s presence alone does not confirm a breach. Follow current vendor guidance before changing extension status. sourceRef
- Review administrative and authentication records. Huntress reported use of ScreenConnect Run Command, while ConnectWise’s response guidance included reviewing relevant records. Examine authentication and partner-account activity, extension changes, administrative actions, Run Command history, and Toolbox records for unfamiliar or unexplained activity. sourceRef
- Check endpoints for unauthorized remote access. Huntress reported rogue ScreenConnect clients and attacker tooling. Compare installed ScreenConnect clients and other remote-management software with an approved baseline; investigate unexpected clients, services, persistence, scripts, and binaries. Correlate endpoint observations with console records rather than relying on a single indicator. sourceRef
- Use a separate investigation channel where appropriate. ConnectWise advised against starting interactive ScreenConnect sessions with potentially compromised customer devices. Use a trusted alternative channel and preserve evidence where feasible. sourceRef
- Review technician identities and devices. Because reports of technician-workstation compromise after interactive sessions remained unconfirmed, MSPs should treat this as a precautionary review rather than an established spread mechanism. Check relevant sign-ins, active sessions, privileged credentials, and endpoint alerts; revoke suspicious sessions or rotate credentials when evidence or incident guidance warrants it. sourceRef
- Coordinate provider and customer response. Establish which tenants, endpoints, accounts, and tools are in scope; preserve relevant logs and document containment actions. These are general incident-response recommendations, not a claim that every customer environment was affected.
Indicators and careful use
Huntress shared indicators for investigation. Its reported items included attacker relay 185.99.255[.]28 (hostname screen); domains newnewnew.gotdns[.]org and soxnewwork.homedns[.]org; a possible additional command-and-control domain, cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com; and secondary C2 sc.payproofkit[.]com (IP 155.94.150[.]39, hostname WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1). Huntress also reported the stager URL hxxps://ns.mo7sen[.]dev/EadF.php?p=4, rogue ScreenConnect client IDs 2588ef5c15954b10 and ed630cc2c873b091, the installer pattern /Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?...&c=Exploited<N>, the attacker name Addmin, and the files Panel-Lateral.ps1, runnew.cmd, and ToolboxRelayUploader.exe. sourceRef
Treat these Huntress-reported indicators as investigative leads, not a complete detection specification. Validate matches against surrounding process, account, network, and management-console evidence; an isolated match does not by itself establish compromise. sourceRef
Lessons for secure remote management
The incident reporting describes unauthorized access to partner accounts and remote-access software in customer environments. As general defensive practice, restrict administrative access, monitor extension changes, retain auditable command histories, and maintain customer-side monitoring independent of a provider’s management console. Review whether identities and extensions have more access than their roles require.
Sources and status
This account reflects reporting published November 11, 2026, including statements attributed to ConnectWise and findings attributed to Huntress. The investigation was ongoing in that reporting: scope and initial access were unsettled, and reports of technician-workstation spread remained unconfirmed. sourceRef
happened in the screenconnect msp campaign